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This celebration of the University of Chicago Law School's Centen-
nial brings to mind another upcoming centennial which is unlikely to be
so heralded. Indeed, it may never come to pass at all, due to the disap-
pearance of the institution for which it would have been held. That cen-
tennial date is 2013, and the institution is the federal income tax.'
The income tax is currently under sustained and increasingly effec-
tive attack from two quite different sources. Consumption tax advocates
contend that the income tax is unnecessarily complex and economically
harmful-penalizing saving and investment in general, and favoring for-
t Seymour Logan Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
1 Although Congress levied an income tax for a brief period during the CivilWar, see William
A. Klein, Joseph Bankman, and Daniel N. Shaviro, Federal Income Taxation 4 (Aspen 12th ed 2000),
the Supreme Court struck down a second attempt to impose such a tax as violative of the constitu-
tional requirement that direct taxes be apportioned "in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration."
US Const Art I, § 9, cl 4. See Pollock v Farmers' Loan & Trust Co, 157 US 429,582 (1894), affd on re-
hearing, 158 US 601 (1895). Enactment of the modern income tax immediately followed the adoption
of the Sixteenth Amendment of the Constitution in 1913.The Sixteenth Amendment provides, "The
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, with-
out apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." US
Const Amend XVI. In recent years, some scholars have discussed whether various consumption tax
proposals would violate the "census or enumeration" test. See, for example, Lawrence Zelenak,
Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator, 99 Colum L Rev 833, 835
(1999) (arguing for the constitutionality of two proposed consumption taxes-the flat tax and the
USA tax- because they do not violate the "Direct Tax" clause of the Constitution and constitute in-
come taxes under the Sixteenth Amendment); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes":
Are Consumption Taxes Unconstitutional?, 97 Colum L Rev 2334,2402-04 (1997) (arguing that value-
added and sales taxes would be indirect taxes and therefore constitutional, while the flat tax and the
USA tax would be direct taxes, and therefore unconstitutional).
2 See, for example, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Carol Gabyzon, Fundamental Tax Reform and
Border Tax Adjustments 5 (Institute for International Economics 1996) (describing the "mind-
numbing complexity of the current system"); Joseph A. Snoe, Tax Simplification and Fairness: Four
Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform, 60 Albany L Rev 61,63 (1996) ("Americans complain their
income tax system is too complicated."); Barbara Kirchheimer, Tax System Seen as Crippling: Law-
makers Urge Move Toward VAT, 54 Tax Notes 1595,1595 (1992) (reporting statements by Represen-
tative Sam Gibbons that he "would like to 'scrap' much of the tax system and replace it with a
"much simpler" VAT).
3 See, for example, Kenneth L. Judd, The Impact of Tax Reform in Modern Dynamic Econo-
mies, in Kevin A. Hassett and R. Glenn Hubbard, eds, Transition Costs of Fundamental Tax Reform 5,
5-6 (AEI 2001) (citing studies showing that the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero and that
switching to consumption taxation would increase savings); Hufbauer and Gabyzon, Fundamental
Tax Reform and Border Tax Adjustments at 5-6 (cited in note 2) (stating that the potential benefit of
a new tax system is to encourage saving and investment, and noting that the current U.S. investment
rate is lower than that of most other countries).
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eign production over domestic production in particular.4 Considerable
political momentum exists for replacing it with a "better" system. Mean-
while, the income tax's utility as a revenue-raising device has been under-
cut by the growth of new avoidance techniques. Not only have financial
engineers devised ever more sophisticated instruments for the legal
avoidance of this tax, but the globalization of financial markets has made
illegal tax evasion easier and more widespread. The convergence of these
trends bodes ill for the survival of the federal income tax system. Even if
a renewed belief in the desirability of the tax were to develop, the tax may
be doomed by its inefficacy.
My purpose here, though, is not to mourn the imminent passing of
the income tax, but rather to point out the various ways that tax has em-
bedded itself in our economic and cultural landscape, and to explain how
its death would likely reshape the world that we take for granted. Al-
though economists have long trumpeted the benefits of "economically
neutral"8 tax systems, Congress has always used the tax code to help fa-
vored groups and to encourage certain activities. Indeed, one commenta-
tor recently concluded that "[w]hen policymakers decide to change the
way we and our economy behave, the tax code more often than not is
their tool of choice."' The question is what will happen when that tool
4 See, for example, James R. Hines, Jr., Fundamental Tax Reform in an InternationalSetting, in
Henry J. Aaron and William G. Gale, eds, Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 465,465-66
(Brookings 1996) (examining the proposition that "consumption-oriented tax reforms would boost
the competitiveness of U.S. companies").
5 See, for example, Mike Allen, Bush to Get Tax Overhaul Ideas,Wash Post A9 (Sept 26,2002)
(discussing then-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill's plan to give tax code recommendations to Presi-
dent Bush); John Berlau, Tax-code Trauma, 18 Insight on the News (Aug 12,2002) (discussing the po-
tential impact of tax code simplification on corporate malfeasance); Dale Jorgenson,A Smarter Type
of Tax, Fin Tunes 17 (June 19, 2002) (discussing the benefits and negative aspects of a consumption
tax); John K. McNulty, Flat Tax, Consumption Tax, Consumption-Type Income Tax Proposals in the
United States: A Tax Policy Discussion of Fundamental Tax Reform, 88 Cal L Rev 2095, 2101-02
(2000) (describing "political excitement" over proposed tax law changes in the last five years of the
twentieth century); Michael J. Graetz, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Income Tax 196-97 (Norton
1997) (noting that after the congressional elections of 1994, "[plroposals for substituting a consump-
tion tax for the income tax vaulted back into the forefront of the nation's political dialogue").
6 See, for example, Lee A. Sheppard, Tax Shelter Opponents Turn Practical,95Tax Notes 1111,
1111 (2002) (describing a recent tax shelter transaction requiring "no upfront cash investment by the
shelter customer").
7 Both the popular and trade press report new tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes on a
weekly basis. See, for example, David Cay Johnston, Death Still Certain, but Taxes May BeSubjectto a
Loophole, NY Times Al (July 28, 2002) (describing a popular scheme to avoid income, gift, genera-
tion-skipping, and estate taxes by exploiting a tax exemption on life insurance); Glenn R. Simpson,A
New Twist in Tax Avoidance: Firms Send Best Ideas Abroad, Wall St J A1 (June 24,2002) (describing a
practice in which companies "stash[] their intellectual property abroad to shelter income from over-
seas sales");John D. McKinnon, IRS Estimates Scope of Offshore Credit-Card Use,Wall St J A3 (Mar
26,2002) ("As many as two million Americans may be using credit or debit cards issued by offshore
banks to maintain easy access to hidden income.").
8 See Michael J. Graetz and Deborah H. Schenk, Federal Income Taxation Principles and Poli-
cies 26 (Foundation 2001).
9 Gene Steuerle, Tax Expenditure Debate, 95 Tax Notes 1521,1521 (2002). See also Linda Su-
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disappears. Some previously favored groups may find themselves bearing
a heavier tax burden. But even those who find their tax burden (or lack
thereof) unchanged may find their position relative to other groups al-
tered- and with that alteration may come behavioral changes. We cannot
look to foreign countries for clues as to what will happen; although many
have adopted consumption taxes, all left pre-existing income tax regimes
in place.
This Essay seeks to outline some of the likely changes. I leave the
reader with the task of evaluating these results. Mere opposition to such
changes is not in itself grounds for opposing the elimination of the in-
come tax, of course. Most of the disappearing tax benefits can be replaced
by direct financial subsidies,0 and perhaps some adjustments in the terms
of the new tax regime. However, such replacements will not spontane-
ously appear. They will require deliberate action by Congress. Whether
such action will - or should - be taken remains uncertain. What is certain
is that the withdrawal of the current subsidies will cause adversely af-
fected taxpayers to clamor for relief. In the ensuing political battles over
the existence and shape of replacements for existing subsidies, politicians
and interest groups will each have large roles to play. Not all of them will
have the public interest at heart when playing these roles. In one sense,
then, what I offer is a roadmap of future political battles and a warning of
the need to prepare for them, on both intellectual and strategic levels.
As the previous paragraph intimates, there is no reason to believe
that the demise of the income tax will trigger a concomitant decrease in
the size of the federal government. Instead, Congress will likely create a
new tax system to replace the revenues currently generated by the income
tax. This Essay assumes that the replacement will take the form of a
European-style value added tax, or VAT. Inasmuch as most current pro-
posals for elimination of the income tax are tied to the enactment of some
form of a consumption tax," this assumption seems at least as reasonable
as any other. But in fact very little of the analysis that follows turns on
which alternative revenue-raising device Congress chooses. Though it is
easier to discuss the implications of abolishing the income tax with refer-
ence to a single replacement tax, the same issues will arise and have to be
dealt with whatever alternative revenue raising mechanism is chosen. In-
deed, this Essay points out how the various flat-tax proposals recently
gin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 Hastings L J 407,408 (1999) ("[T]he
federal government spent more money through the [tax c]ode [in 1998] than through the discretion-
ary appropriations process.").
10 Indeed, many scholars have long argued for such a switch. See, for example, VictorThuronyi,
Tax Expenditures:A Reassessment, 1988 Duke L J 1155,1205-06; Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a
Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures,
83 Harv L Rev 705,737-38 (1970).
11 See, for example, McNulty, 88 Cal L Rev at 2105 (cited in note 5).
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under consideration'2 stake out different positions on some of these is-
sues.
This Essay is far from comprehensive. It omits discussion of progres-
sivity, an issue that has long been at the heart of the income
tax/consumption tax debate." The effect on nonprofit organizations has
also been the subject of extensive previous commentary," and is omitted
here. My focus instead is on less-discussed, but important collateral con-
sequences of a shift in taxing mechanisms.
I. FRINGE BENEFITS
An obvious place to start looking for collateral consequences is the
tax expenditure budget.'5 Although much dispute exists about which tax
12 The VAT is just one of many ways to implement a consumption tax.Two different "personal-
ized, direct consumption-based tax reform proposals" have been introduced in Congress. Id at 2101-
02. Representative Armey's "Flat Tax" proposal, based on the work of Stanford professors Robert
Hall and Alvin Robushka, would have imposed a cash-flow, subtraction-method VAT on businesses,
coupled with a wage tax on employees. See id at 2117-21. Senators Domenici, Nunn, and Kerry's
proposed "USA [Unlimited Savings Allowance] tax" amounted to an "income tax with an unlimited
deduction for net new savings." Id at 2121. For a more extensive discussion of these proposals, see
generally David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 Stan L Rev 599 (2000) (arguing that the
case for the flat tax is weakened by analysis revealing that it is both more complex and less efficient
than claimed); Graetz, Decline of the Income Tax at 212-43 (cited in note 5) (describing the proposed
flat tax and USA tax in detail and examining the proposals' implications for fairness, ease of admini-
stration, and effect on the size of government).
13 See generally George K. Yin, Accommodating the "Low-Income" in a Cash-Flow or Con-
sumed Income Tax World, 2 Fla Tax Rev 445 (1995) (examining the potential effects on progressivity
of switching to a broad-based consumption tax or the Nunn-Domenici proposed tax and concluding
that the implementation of progressivity measures would compromise the proposals' stated advan-
tages of simplicity and neutrality in treatment of present versus future consumption); Alvin Warren,
Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 Yale L J 1081 (1980) (comparing the
income tax to the consumption tax for purposes of fairness and concluding that the truly important
issue is the taxation of wealth, which can be achieved by either); Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 Harv L Rev 1575 (1979) (arguing that the practical problems of im-
plementing a progressive personal tax on consumption are more severe than suggested and as such,
the income tax should remain in effect).
14 See generally Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert,
66 Tenn L Rev 687 (1999) (examining the direct and indirect tax benefits enjoyed by nonprofit or-
ganizations under existing law and predicting the effects of various proposed tax changes-
incremental to fundamental -both in the absence of and coupled with direct government subsidies);
Price Waterhouse LLP and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, Impact of Tax Restructuring on Tax-
Exempt Organizations 3 (1997) (noting that consumption tax proposals abolishing or altering the
charitable deduction would have a significant effect on giving); Charles T. Clotfelter and Richard L.
Schmalbeck, The Impact of Fundamental Tax Reform on Nonprofit Organizations, in Aaron and
Gale, eds, Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform 211 (cited in note 4) (providing an overview
of current tax treatment of nonprofit organizations and concluding that the various proposals for
fundamental tax reform - though not targeted at nonprofit organizations - could have a deleterious
financial effect on them).
15 Most readers know that the tax expenditure budget, published annually as part of the fed-
eral budget document, estimates the implicit cost of tax rules that depart from the normal tax struc-
ture. The construction of this budget, involving as it does the identification of a "normal tax struc-
ture" and "departures" from it, has been the subject of continuing controversy. See Bruce Bartlett,
The End of Tax Expenditures as We Know Them?, 92 Tax Notes 413,414-17 (2001) (recounting the
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provisions should be included in the budget and whether associated reve-
nue losses have been properly computed, all agree that specifically favor-
able tax treatment of an activity can encourage increases in participation
and investment in that activity. For many years, two fringe benefits, quali-
fied pension plans and employer-provided health care plans, have ap-
peared as the largest revenue-losers in the tax expenditure budget.'6 These
benefits qualify for the same favorable tax treatment: In both cases, the
tax system treats their cost as a deductible business expense of the em-
ployer while excluding their value from the income of recipient employ-
ees. 7 Employees covered under employer plans come out better, finan-
cially, than those who receive higher cash salaries and use their extra dol-
lars to purchase similar coverage individually." These cost differentials
provide a powerful impetus for employer, as opposed to individual, provi-
sion of these benefits. Eliminating the income tax will reduce this finan-
cial incentive for employer provision, with the potential for significant
real-world effects. As these effects on pension plans and health insurance
will be somewhat different, each is discussed in turn.
A. Health Care
About 80 percent of Americans covered by private medical
insurance receive their insurance through employer-sponsored plans."
The prevalence of employer provision is no accident, but rather a
response to economic factors. One of these factors, as described above, is
the existence and operation of the federal income tax system. The other
factor is employer access to group insurance plans, which charge
favorable group insurance rates.
Very few employers provide health insurance out of altruistic mo-
tives. They do so because it makes economic sense: They can (and do) re-
coup the cost of such programs from their employees in the form of lower
cash wages. Employees implicitly accept lower wages in return for health
insurance coverage. But employees, too, are rational. They will not trade
history of disputes over the existence and meaning of baseline).
16 See Jonathan Gruber and James Poterba, Fundamental Tax Reform and Employer-Provided
Health Insurance, in Aaron and Gale, eds, Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, 125,125
(cited in note 4) (stating that both employer-financed health insurance and pension plans "reduce[]
federal income tax revenues by nearly $60 billion a year [each]").
17 See 26 USC § 106(a) (2000) (excluding employer-provided coverage under a health plan);
26 USC § 402(a) (2000) (providing for taxation of distributions from employee trusts).
18 Individual taxpayers can claim an itemized deduction for medical expenses, including premi-
ums for health insurance, only to the extent they exceed 7.5 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income. 26 USC § 213(a) (2000). Although some individuals can contribute on an income tax-free ba-
sis to individual retirement accounts, the allowable amounts are very limited. See 26 USC
§ 219(b)(5)(A) (stating that the maximum deductible amount shall not exceed $3000, phased up to
$5000 in 2008 and beyond).
19 See Employee Benefit Research Institute, EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits 238 (3d ed
1995) (Table 8.1).
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away more cash salary than these health insurance benefits are worth to
them. Further, there is reason to question whether employees value such
benefits even at their market cost. At present, the favorable tax treatment
helps elide this valuation issue. A taxpayer facing a marginal income tax
rate of 34 percent is happy to trade $100 in cash salary for health insur-
ance "worth" only $80, while the employer is happy to provide such in-
surance as long as it costs less than $100. The question is what will happen
when that tax advantage disappears.
The first thing to realize is that the disappearance primarily affects
higher-income employees, and even they will not lose their entire tax
benefit. The federal income tax is only one of several taxes providing
preferential treatment for employer-provided health insurance. The fed-
eral social security tax and state income taxes accord similar treatment.
That is, the social security wage tax base and state income tax bases also
exclude employer contributions to health plans. For a large segment of
the population, the social security tax is a heavier financial burden than
the federal income tax."' Thus, this segment of the employee base will con-
tinue to receive the lion's share of their pre-existing tax benefit even after
elimination of the income tax, assuming employer-provided health plans
remain in place. Nonetheless, the social security tax rate is lower than in-
come tax rates; the benefit of the social security tax exclusion also largely
phases out as an employee's cash income exceeds the social security tax
wage limit. Repeal of the federal income tax will significantly diminish
the tax benefits currently enjoyed by higher - and even middle - income
employees. For example, an employee with $100,000 of taxable income
currently faces a marginal income tax rate of 31 percent. Under current
law, she saves $1,550 in taxes, or enjoys an after-tax income that is $1,550
higher, if her employer pays her with a $5,000 health insurance policy
rather than an additional $5,000 in cash salary.2 Eliminating the income
20 The social security tax levy begins on the first dollar of earned income. By contrast, the com-
bination of the standard deduction, personal exemptions, and, where applicable, earned income tax
credits and child care tax credits precludes federal income taxation of most low-income people. For
example, in 2001, a single, childless individual would have had to have earned $8,580 before paying a
single dollar of income tax; a married couple with two dependent children would have been able to
earn $33,825 (which would put them in the third quartile-or middle-of the U.S. income distribu-
tion) prior to paying any income tax. See Len Burman, Elaine Maag, and Jeff Rohaly, The Effect of
the 2001 Tax Cut on Low- and Middle-Income Families and Children, 96 Tax Notes 247, 254 (2002)
(Table 5c). Even at those income levels, however, most taxpayers would have substantial payroll tax
obligations. See id at 256-57.
21 There is no wage cap for the Medicare portion of the payroll tax, but at present it represents
only about one-quarter of the payroll tax burden. See Jeff Lemieux, Federal Budgeting in an Era of
Surpluses, 5 Georgetown Pub Pol Rev 7,19 (1999) (stating that a potential Social Security reform
would be to have a portion of workers' current payroll taxes paid to a new Social Security personal
investment account, for which the government would match funds for lower income workers only).
22 The employer may appropriate some of this money for itself through salary adjustments. If
so, the loss of the tax benefit will hurt both the employer and the employee, though their total loss
will not exceed the $1550 identified in this example. Regardless of who benefited from the income
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tax eliminates the financial incentive to choose the health insurance pol-
icy over cash compensation. Although she may not have to pay any tax on
account of her receipt of health coverage under a VAT regime, the appli-
cable VAT will not be avoided by having her employer purchase the
insurance on her behalf. Either her employer will have to pay the VAT
when purchasing the insurance, in which case it will pass the additional
tax cost through to her in the form of a lower cash salary, or the employer
will raise her cash salary by the amount previously spent on health insur-
ance and the employee will have to pay the VAT upon her purchase of
health coverage. The important point is that from the employee's stand-
point, under a VAT regime it makes no difference (all other things being
equal) whether she receives the last $5,000 of her compensation in the
form of cash or health coverage. The same tax is paid in either case. The
question is what difference this will make. Will these employees push for
a higher cash salary instead of employer-provided health insurance?
They may do exactly that if they value this coverage at less than its
cost or if they feel they can get it less expensively from other sources. The
first possibility is relatively unlikely. After all, higher-income people tend
to have more assets to protect against the financial demands of an expen-
sive accident or illness; they are also less likely to qualify for government
or charity care than less highly compensated employees." The second pos-
sibility is more difficult to evaluate. Employers will continue to have pref-
erential access to group insurance rates.25 But many people have the op-
portunity to join other groups for health insurance purposes, from local
bar associations to the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP). These groups may provide more attractive options for some,
and possibly many, highly compensated employees.
One financial fact of employer-provided coverage that tends to be
overlooked is the extent of employee cross-subsidization. Premiums for
the group are set in accordance with the experience ratings2 of the group,
tax exemption, the effect of removing the tax incentive remains the same; cash and health insurance
become equivalent methods of providing compensation.
23 As discussed in text accompanying note 31, purchases of health insurance policies may be
excluded from the VAT. While that may make such purchases relatively more attractive than other
consumption goods, this attractiveness does not hinge on employer provision as does the current tax
incentive. An employee could obtain the same advantage by receiving a higher cash salary and per-
sonally purchasing individual health coverage.
24 See Gruber and Poterba, Fundamental Tax Reform and Employer-Provided Health Insurance
at 140 (cited in note 16) ("Explicit public insurance (medicaid) and implicit public insurance (care at
public hospitals) may be more relevant alternatives for low-income persons than for those in higher-
income brackets.").
25 See id at 148 ("[T]he cost of insurance for groups with fewer than five persons is an esti-
mated 35 percent higher than the cost for groups with ten thousand or more members.").
26 See Cheralyn E. Schessler, Liability Implications of Utilization Review as a Cost Containment
Mechanism, 8 J Contemp Health L & Pol 379,390 n 78 (1992) (stating that under the experience-
ratings process "the employer receives a credit or dividend for the amount of premium paid over that
paid out for claims and expenses and a debit for any amount by which claims and expenses exceed
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rather than each insured individual. The cost of providing care for a small
number of very expensive members shows up as an increase in general
premium levels. Healthy members of the employee group may be able tojoin with other healthy individuals to obtain a better rate than that paid
through the employer in the form of lower wages. If a significant number
of low-cost individuals self-select out of the employer plan, the cost of in-
suring those left behind in the employer plan will rise. Even if the remain-
ing employees agree to shoulder these increased costs7 in order to receive
continuing health coverage, they will be worse off financially than they
are under the current regime. A vicious cycle may ensue that in the end
virtually eliminates the insurance function of group health insurance,
turning it into little more than a scheduled payment plan for medical
costs, and imperils the financial feasibility of employer-provided health
insurance. It may turn out that the benefits of the income tax subsidy
were narrower than they appeared, mostly limited to the working sick."
Although many sophisticated observers routinely disparage the
country's reliance on tax-favored, employer-provided health insurance
coverage, claiming it leads to excessive utilization and excessively high
fees,n there has been little discussion of what its elimination or reduction
would do to the truly ill. Elimination of the federal income tax may, of
necessity, spark such a conversation in the private insurance market about
the obligations of the healthy (if any) toward those who are unhealthy.
This is not an easy subject, either morally or practically, although a model
might be found in the assigned risk or bad driver pool maintained for car
insurance purposes." Of course, national health insurance would be an-other option.
the premium").
27 They will not have many alternatives if they want health coverage, due to their pre-existing
medical conditions.
28 See Gruber and Poterba, Fundamental Tax Reform and Employer-Provided Health Insurance
at 148-49 (cited in note 16) (stating that the net-of-tax benefit of employer-provided health insurance
to families in poor health is more than twice as high as that to families in good health).
29 See Bryan Down, et al, The Effect of Tax-Exempt Out-of-Pocket Premiums on Health Plan
Choice, 64 Natl Tax J 741,741-42 (2001) ("Generally, the exemption of health insurance premiums
from personal income and FICA taxes is unpopular among health economists."); Martin S. Feldstein,
The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J Polit Econ 251,251-55 (1973) (stating that the tax
benefits of employer-provided health insurance and employees' assumption that employer payments
for health insurance do not result in lower wages cause employees to be overinsured, and arguing
that a reduction in insurance coverage would result in a net utility increase).
30 All fifty states have "financial responsibility laws" requiring drivers or car owners to pur-
chase liability insurance. See Ryan A. Earhart, Lifting the Iron Curtain of Automobile Insurance
Regulation,49 SC L Rev 1193,1195 (1998). States have come up with several devices to help drivers
unable to find insurance on the voluntary market because of their poor driving records. The most
common of these devices, the assigned risk plan, randomly assigns risky drivers to insurance compa-
nies; the number of such drivers assigned to each company varies in proportion to such company's
share of the state's automobile liability market. See Suzanne Yelen, Withdrawal Restrictions in the
Automobile Insurance Market, 102 Yale L J 1431,1434 (1993) (discussing liability policies in forty-two
states and the District of Columbia). Insurance companies are forced to write policies covering the
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Merely exempting purchases of health insurance premiums from
VAT will not replicate the benefits accorded these programs under the
current income tax system because VATs are cumulative. Excluding the
premiums avoids payment of tax only on the "value added" at the level of
the insurance company. This means, essentially, the tax due on the insur-
ance company's cost of administration and profit. Tax will already have
been collected with respect to the underlying health care expenditures.
Only if those expenditures are "zero-rated"- a much more complicated
process3' -will the amount of the government subsidy approach its cur-
rent value. The complications will increase .if the zero-rating is limited to
employer-provided health care, as would be necessary to maintain the
current incentive structure.
The various flat tax proposals could have provided tax favors that
more closely approximate the status quo. Interestingly, neither of the re-
cent proposals did. The original Hall-Rabushka model, on which the Ar-
mey "Flat Tax" bill was based, would have taxed health insurance benefits
by denying employers a deduction for the cost of the premiums when cal-
culating the tax due at the business level. 2 The Nunn-Domenici "USA
Tax" proposal required imputation to employees of the value of em-
ployer-provided insurance, thus taxing it in their hands.3
B. Pension Benefits
Given that one of the major selling points of consumption taxes is
their propensity to encourage savings (at least as compared to income
taxes), " it is ironic that the substitution of a VAT for the income tax is
likely to reduce the savings of some groups of taxpayers. Current law en-
tices many employers to maintain pension plans for the benefit of em-
ployees. Such pension plans are not mandatory; rational employers pro-
vide them, like health insurance plans, only if their costs can be recouped
drivers assigned to them. Often these policies must be offered at regulated rates that fail to cover the
expected costs of such coverage. In such situations, insurers use the premiums of low-risk drivers to
subsidize high-risk drivers. See id. Some have suggested a similar approach be used in the health in-
surance market, with insurance companies forced to write policies for high-claims individuals at rates
subsidized in part by higher premiums paid by healthier individuals. See H. Richard Beresfor, The
Health Security Act: Coercion and Distrust for the Market, 79 Cornell L Rev 1405, 1423-25 (1993)
(suggesting different approaches to guaranteeing assured access to private health insurance).
31 See Alan A. Tait, Value Added Tax: International Practice and Problems 50-54 (IMF 1988)
(noting five reasons why the European Community disfavored the zero rate, including "high adminis-
trative costs").
32 See McNulty, 88 Cal L Rev at 2118 (cited in note 5).
33 See Gruber and Poterba, Reform and Employer-Provided Health Insurance at 137 (cited in
note 16) (discussing problems with imputation).
34 See Henry J.Aaron and William G. Gale, Introduction,in Aaron and Gale, eds, Economic Ef-
fects of Fundamental Tax Reform 1, 2 (cited in note 4).
35 In 1993,57 percent of civilian workers worked for an employer sponsoring a retirement plan,
and 76 percent of them (44 percent of overall employees) participated in such plans. Employee
Benefit Research Institute, Databook at 69 (cited in note 19).
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by payment of lower cash salaries. In today's world, where many employ-
ees value a dollar of cash salary more than the compounded value of that
dollar received after retirement, only the spread between the after-tax
benefit of cash and the after-tax benefit of pension plans makes this nec-
essary offset possible in many cases.
The tax benefits accorded to pension plans will not disappear with
the advent of a VAT. Assuming the rate at which the VAT is imposed ap-
proximates current marginal rates of income tax, the benefits of investing
in a pension plan will remain the same. Monies invested in such a plan,
whether as initial contributions or reinvestments of earnings, will avoid
taxation until distribution just as under current law. However, as this
treatment will be afforded all forms of savings, employer-provided pen-
sion plans will lose their monopoly on favorable tax treatment. Given that
employer pension plans are expensive to administer, employers and em-
ployees may both decide they are better off letting workers save for their
own retirement independent of the workplace. Workers may be unwilling
to forgo the additional salary necessary to compensate employers for ad-
ministrative costs when they have the ability to invest their salary on
equally tax-favored terms. Employers may refuse to incur the consider-
able expense and aggravation involved in maintaining an employer plan
without such compensation. The same effects would follow from the
adoption of any other consumption tax."
This would not be a problem if employees in fact invested the corre-
sponding increase in cash salary. However, all evidence indicates that
many employees will lack the financial discipline to do so. A very large
percentage of employees fail to roll-over the balances in their 401(k) or
other defined contribution plan accounts when those accounts are paid
out because of a change in employers.7 This failure occurs despite the im-
position of a tax penalty, a penalty that is imposed at a rate higher than
any likely VAT rate. " Further, a startlingly large number of employees fail
to make elective contributions towards employer-subsidized defined con-
tribution plans." Recent scholarship indicates the large role played by in-
ertia and the importance of default rules.' Employee decisions as to
36 The American Academy of Actuaries predicted that replacing the income tax with a con-
sumption tax would have "a major adverse impact on the private pension system," a view shared by
one of the originators of the flat tax concept, Alvin Robushka. Graetz, Decline of the Income Tax at
238 (cited in note 5).
37 See Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan Participants, 77 NYU L Rev
71, 96 (2002) (stating that 68 percent of 401(k) plan participants take cash distributions instead of
rolling over their plan account balances upon switching jobs).
38 Withdrawals are subject to a 10 percent penalty tax in addition to the regular income tax.
See id at 95.
39 See id at 80 (stating that participation in pension plans ranges from 50 percent to 90 per-
cent).
40 See id at 81-83 (citing studies revealing the role of "inertia" as evidenced by the experience
of companies offering pension plans featuring automatic enrollment with an opt out).
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whether to participate in a 401(k) plan and how much to contribute to
such plans seem to depend as much on the plans' default rules as on em-
ployee choice. Plan participation, especially by employees with the lowest
compensation, increases markedly when employees have to opt-out,
rather than opt-in, to such plans." In addition, employees tend to contrib-
ute whatever percentage of income is set as the default contribution rate
under the plan. 2 If many employees lack the initiative or financial sophis-
tication to sign up for a readily available, already structured, and rela-
tively hassle-free employer sponsored retirement plan that seems com-
patible with their personal financial objectives, it seems unlikely that they
will save more under a wholly privatized system, since under a privatized
system, employees will have to locate appropriate investment vehicles, 3 as
well as decide on a contribution rate, take care of paperwork, and the like.
Even if the total amount of saving goes up, as economists predict,
ownership of those savings may be even more skewed than it already is.4
The absence of private retirement savings will leave more people wholly
dependent on social insurance for their retirement income, increasing the
pressure placed on this country's social security system. Those who begin
by viewing the goal of increased investment with some skepticism will
doubtless consider these distributional consequences particularly trouble-
some.
II. HOMEOWNER EQUITY
Employer-provided pension plans have been one common form of
savings for retirement; so too has home equity. One question is whether
such equity will be impaired by the move to a VAT. Home ownership re-
ceives extraordinarily favorable treatment under the rules of the current
income tax. Not only does the tax system ignore the non-cash income
41 See Cass Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 NYU L Rev 106,115-16 (2002), referring
to a study by Brigitte C. Madrian and Dennis F Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, online at http://ssm.com/id=223635 (visited Dec 3,2002);Stabile,
77 NYU L Rev at 81 (cited in note 37).
42 See Stabile, 77 NYU L Rev at 82 (cited in note 37).
43 A related question is the effect on insurance companies, which have traditionally offered a
variety of savings plans for relatively unsophisticated (and sophisticated) investors. On the one hand,
insurance-mediated savings will lose their unique claim to tax benefits; all savings vehicles will be
treated the same. On the other hand, they will have a larger pool of potential purchasers if employers
bow out of the pension enterprise.
44 See Daniel I. Halperin and Michael J. Graetz, Comprehensive Tax Reform and Employee
Benefits: The Case of Employment-Based Pensions and Health Insurance, in Dallas L. Salisbury, ed,
Tax Reform: Implications for Economic Security and Employee Benefits 35,39 (Employee Benefit
Research Center 1997). In addition, private savings arrangements would be free of the various regu-
latory safeguards currently applicable to employer-provided pension plans. See Weisbach, 52 Stan L
Rev at 654 (cited in note 12) ("[U]nder the Flat Tax, the law could not impose any significant re-
quirements on pensions except perhaps to the extent the pensions provide some market benefit
above and beyond private savings."). Though recent events have cast doubt on the utility of some of
those safeguards, they also illustrate the lack of financial sophistication of the average employee.
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generated by such ownership (in other words, imputed income equal to
the rental value of the premises), but it also allows deductions for some of
the costs of generating this non-taxable income, such as mortgage inter-
est"5 and property taxes.4 It even exempts a substantial portion of the cash
income realized with respect to such property in the form of capital gains
at the time of sale." Given these advantages, it is perhaps not surprising
that close to 40 percent of this country's capital stock comes in the form
of owner-occupied housing.4 How will this investment fare under a con-
sumption tax regime? The economic literature presents a mixed, if not in-
coherent, picture of the likely results.
49
The seeming incoherence comes from the cross-cutting results of
changing tax rules. Assuming that expenditures on housing are treated as
consumption rather than investment expenditures, purchasers of new
homes would have to pay VAT on the full purchase price, raising the cost
of purchase!" Meanwhile, sales of existing houses would be exempt from
VAT,' immediately increasing their value relative to that of new houses.2
The result in the short run would be a reallocation of wealth from new
entrants in the housing market to established homeowners, which may
help ease the pain of homeowners faced with the loss of the mortgage in-
terest deduction. 3 However, the across-the-board increase in housing
45 See 26 USC § 163(a) (2000) (allowing deduction for interest paid on indebtedness). The
mortgage interest deduction extends the benefit of the income exclusion to a larger class of taxpay-
ers, those who must borrow to finance their housing purchases.
46 See 26 USC § 164(a)(1) (2000).
47 See 26 USC § 121(a) (2000).
48 See Dennis R. Capozza, Richard K. Green, and Patric H. Hendershott, Taxes; Mortgage Bor-
rowing, and Residential Land Prices, in Aaron and Gale, eds, Economic Effects of Fundamental Tax
Reform 171,171 (cited in note 4) (stating that owner-occupied housing constitutes 40 percent of the
nation's capital stock).
49 Compare id at 197-98 (projecting a 10-20 percent decrease in house prices), with Donald
Bruce and Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Will a Consumption Tax Kill the Housing Market?, in Hassett and
Hubbard, eds, Transition Costs of Fundamental Tax Reform 96, 110 (cited in note 3) (projecting a
"modest" price impact).
50 See Bruce and Holtz-Eakin, Will a Consumption Tax Kill the Housing Market? at 100,112-13
n 3 (cited in note 49) (stating that "tax on purchase price is equivalent to 'prepaying' a stream of fu-
ture taxes on the annual consumption value" of the house).
51 See Tax Executives Institute, Value-Added Taxes: A Comparative Analysis 24 (Tax Execs
1992) ("Under most existing value-added systems, the purchase of a previously constructed home
does not constitute a taxable transaction."). Although this treatment may be the result of practical
considerations, it can be defended theoretically since (except in the transition period) the first pur-
chaser should have paid a VAT covering the entire consumption stream generated by the house. See
also note 54.
52 See Bruce and Holtz-Eakin, Will a Consumption Tax Killthe Housing Market? at 98 (cited in
note 49) ("Older, existing homes would enjoy a tax-based advantage of 20 percent, leading to a rise
in their value.").
53 See id (noting that the loss of deductibility would mitigate the tax reform's effect of enhanc-
ing the value of older bpmes). A separate issue is whether interest payments will be treated as tax-
able consumption expenditures. Most VAT regimes exempt financial intermediaries from the tax base
due to the difficulty of calculating the appropriate tax under the credit method; some impose alterna-
tive taxes. See Tax Executives Institute, Value-Added Taxes: A Comparative Analysis at 23 (cited in
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prices may drive away potential home purchasers. Particularly when
combined with the fact that, under a consumption tax, other investment
assets will enjoy the same or better tax treatment than housing (not to
mention the non-deductibility of interest expenses), consumers may de-
cide to rebalance their portfolios away from housing (or consumption
generally)." People may opt for rental units or smaller houses as they do
in Europe. If so, the demand for, and thus the price of, housing will de-
cline. It is impossible to predict with confidence which of these effects will
predominate.
These issues are equally open when it comes to other forms of
consumption taxation. Decisions have to be made as to whether to allow
the deduction of home mortgage interest and real estate taxes, whether to
treat house purchases as investment or consumption, and whether to tax
gains generated from the sale of real estate. The difficulty of these issues,
at least in political terms, is illustrated by the fact that the different legisla-
tive proposals for such taxes proffered different answers to these ques-
tions-answers in no way justified by theoretical purity. The USA tax
provided a deduction for home mortgage interest55 while Representative
Armey's flat tax did not."
Because of the prevalence of property taxation, any fluctuation in
housing prices is likely to have an impact on the financial health of gov-
ernmental units that directly rely upon property tax revenue, at least until
the will develops to adjust property tax rates. But the elimination of the
income tax will have more profound effects on state and local govern-
ments than temporary fluctuations in property tax revenues. These effects
are discussed in the next Part.
III. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The current tax rules provide several advantages to state and local
governments. First, certain tax payments to state and local governments
note 51) (stating that it is difficult to calculate liability under the credit method for service industries
because "the value of the service is imbedded in the price of the overall transaction"); Tait, Value
Added Tax: Practice and Problems at 92-100 (cited in note 31) (noting that no countries using aVAT
fully taxed financial services, but arguing that "[vialue added in banking and insurance is no less ap-
propriate for inclusion in the VAT base than any other service or provision of goods").
54 See Bruce and Holtz-Eakin, Will a Consumption Ta Kill the Housing Market? at 105 (cited
in note 49) (noting that "the increased cost of new homes would channel scarce capital to other, more
valuable uses in the economy"); William G. Gale, Commentary in Hassett and Hubbard, eds, Transi-
tion Costs of Fundamental Tax Reform 115, 116 (cited in note 3) (noting that under a consumption
tax, "the real value of old houses relative to other consumption goods would not .. . change[], even
though the nominal price of old housing would ... increase[]"). At least, consumers will rebalance
away from housing to the extent their housing decision includes an investment component, since
other investments (not subject to VAT) will be cheaper; it will maintain its relative value compared to
other consumption goods since a VAT would apply to all such purchases. See id.
55 See McNulty, 88 Cal L Rev at 2121 (cited in note 5).
56 See id at 2120.
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can be taken as itemized deductions. Second, some of such governments
are allowed to sell bonds bearing tax-exempt interest. Finally, they gain
certain administrative advantages by basing their own income tax systems
on the federal tax system. All of these advantages will disappear along
with the federal income tax. The effect of each disappearance will be dis-
cussed in turn.
A commonly expressed fear is that the elimination of the deduction
for state and local taxes will reduce subordinate governments' ability to
generate tax revenue.57 Taxpayers will increase their resistance to tax in-
creases in the absence of the partial relief provided through the federal
income tax system. It is unclear how much significance this claim has.
Relatively few taxpayers itemize their deductions;" those who do not
would lose nothing from the switch. Indeed, members of the nonitemizing
group may regard tax payments more favorably under a VAT regime,
since presumably such tax payments will not themselves be subject to a
VAT." To the extent such taxes fund benefits that are properly viewed as
consumption expenses, state provision may be slightly more favored rela-
tive to private provision in a VAT regime than under the present income
tax regime.6
The effect on debt capacity may be more serious. Under current law,
the interest generated through ownership of state and local bonds can be
61excluded from income for tax purposes. In most cases, purchasers of such
debt end up about where they would have been had they purchased cor-
porate debt; the value of the exclusion passes through to states and locali-
ties, which offer debt bearing interest at a rate lower than comparably
risky corporate bonds. The move to a consumption tax will provide all
borrowers with the same tax treatment. ' Though interest rates on currentdebt will remain fixed for the life of the debt,3 new issuances will become
57 See Tax Executives Institute, Value-Added Taxes:A Comparative Analysis at 29-30 (cited in
note 51) ("[T]he States are concerned that the imposition of a federal consumption tax would ad-
versely affect their revenue-generating ability.").
58 Only about 31 percent of individual taxpayers claimed itemized deductions in 1998. See U.S.
Census Bureau, StatisticalAbstract of the United States:2001 314 (GPO 121st ed 2001) (Table 473).
59 The amount of the tax levy may be higher, however, because the burden of the tax will have
been built into the prices of products and services purchased by the government. As discussed earlier
in the health care context, see text accompanying note 31, exempting from VAT only the last in a
string of interlocking payments may not significantly reduce the economic burden of the tax.
60 The extent of the advantage will depend on the tax treatment of purchases by state and local
governments Taxpayers may avoid only the last increment of the VAT, that payable on the "value
added" by the government administrator, or more, depending on how far down the chain of purchase
the tax exemption goes. See text accompanying note 31 (discussing difference between exemption
and zero-rating in the health insurance context).
61 See 26 USC § 103(a) (2000).
62 No one will owe VAT solely on account of receiving interest income; tax will be collected
when such interest is consumed, regardless of its source.
63 Holders of such debt will see its value, and their wealth, decrease when the tax benefits
evaporate, assuming no transition rule.
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more expensive as the purchasers refuse to accept anything less than the
market rates of interest. As a result, governments may decide to reduce
the amount of future issuances, either funding projects out of current in-
come or forgoing them altogether.
The extent of the harm to states and localities will depend on how
great an increase they experience in interest rates. If enactment of a con-
sumption tax in fact drives up savings rates, the resulting increase in in-
vestable capital may depress the market rate of interest. Still, it seems
unlikely that the general market rate of interest will fall all the way down
to the current tax-exempt rate.
There is also the matter of the states' administrative capacity to
maintain their own income taxes in the absence of a federal income tax.
At present, most states rely on the federal definition of taxable income as
the starting point for their own tax base calculations." They also obtain
considerable amounts of information from federal authorities on the au-
diting side, information generated by the federal government in the
course of monitoring and auditing the implementation of the federal in-
come tax."' The federal government, for example, passes on to states in-
formation gleaned from its much more extensive system for matching in-
formation returns to individual and corporate returns.' State tax authori-
ties often piggyback on federal dispute resolution procedures as well. " In
short, although states maintain their own income tax administrations, they
benefit greatly from the existence of a federal tax administration, an ad-
ministration that will disappear along with the tax. State tax systems will
become more expensive to run; the additional expense may cause states
to move to another revenue-raising mechanism, a decision that may itself
have collateral consequences.
These same issues have to be dealt with under other consumption
tax proposals. Deductions may, but need not, be granted for state and lo-
cal tax payments; state and local bonds may, but need not, be granted fa-
vorable treatment.6 The only way to avoid the administrative complica-
64 See Jerome R. Helerstein and Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation: Cases and
Materials 888 (West 7th ed 2001) (personal income taxes); id at 417-18 (corporate income taxes).
65 See Robert P. Strauss, Administrative and Revenue Implications of Alternative Federal
Consumption Taxes for the State and Local Sector, 14 Am J Tax Pol 361,387-96 (1997) (reciting the
evolution of federal-state information sharing for tax audit purposes).
66 See id at 392 (describing federal and state reporting systems as "increasingly entwined").
67 See id at 394-95.
68 The "USA tax" would have preserved the relative advantage of state and local bonds by al-
lowing investors both to deduct the cost of purchasing the bonds and to exclude the interest received
from them. While investors would have been able to deduct the cost of other investments, the income
generated from them would have been included in the tax base. See McNulty, 88 Cal L Rev at 2122
(cited in note 5) (stating that the USA tax would maintain the "familiar" exclusion of state and local
bond interest). The Armey flat tax did not have a similar provision. See Strauss, 14 Am J Tax Pol at
405-07 (cited in note 65) (discussing the details of the Armey flat tax proposal and its effect on items
included in the calculated tax base); Alice G.Abreu, Untangling Tax Reform: Simple Taxes, Complex
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tions would be for the states to eliminate their income tax systems and
piggyback on whatever the federal tax rules happen to be."
CONCLUSION
Once one starts looking, one can find the shaping force exerted by
the federal income tax on practically every arena of economic and civic
life. This Essay just begins to identify and evaluate the myriad dislocations
and changes that would be brought about by its repeal. Not all change is
bad, of course. But when so many changes will occur in such short order,
the task of identifying and correcting undesirable ones will be far from
easy.
It will be interesting to see how well our political institutions cope
with this task. There are grounds for both optimism and pessimism. Con-
gress can look on this as an opportunity to engage in zero-based-
budgeting,"' a chance to sweep away out-dated or ill-conceived incentives
and subsidies. Or Congress's members can take advantage of the situa-
tion, using it to pry ever more campaign contributions out of special in-
terest groups anxious to arrange replacements for extinguished tax bene-
fits." No other government has faced this precise challenge. Although
many other countries have imposed VATs, they used them as sources of
additional revenue rather than as replacements for pre-existing income
tax. Ultimately, of course, it is up to us, the voting public, to make sure
that some version of the optimistic story comes to pass.
Choices, 33 San Diego L Rev 1355,1366 n 34 (1996) (stating that the USA tax has exclusions for tax-
exempt bond interests, unlike the Armey flat tax).
69 See Weisbach, 52 Stan L Rev at 659 (cited in note 12) ("Unless states switched to a base
similar to the Flat Tax, few of the implementation benefits of the Flat Tax would be achieved.").
70 Zero-based budgeting requires lawmakers to use zero governmental expenditures as a start-
ing point and to justify all funding for each program after specifying and ranking objectives and con-
sidering all the possible means of obtaining those objectives. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the
Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 Harv J on Legis 387,393 (1998). In-
stead of evaluating cash expenditures, of course, in this context Congress would be evaluating tax ex-
penditures, or revenue concessions.This is precisely the sort of analysis that Stanley Surrey hoped to
provoke by constructing and publishing the tax expenditure budget. See Stanley S. Surrey, Pathways
to Tax Reform 180-81 (Harvard 1973). It will be truly ironic if it is provoked instead by the death of
the taxing mechanism he cherished.
71 See Richard L. Doernberg and Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 Minn L Rev 913,959 (1987) (noting that in the "real world of taxation,"
politicians' "personal demands ... also drive the tax legislation process").
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